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Kristin Gjesdal’s Gadamer and the Legacy of German Idealism is an im-
pressive work. It approaches Gadamer’s views with a critical tone marked 
by a vigor which one rarely encounters in the commentary literature 
on Gadamer. Gjesdal accuses Gadamer for building his hermeneutics on 
highly narrow and in some cases plain right false readings of the views 
of some historical figures of philosophy and aesthetics, such as Kant and 
Hegel. These misunderstandings are not important for exegetical rea-
sons alone, for, in Gjesdal’s opinion, they ultimately reveal the limits of 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics which emphasizes the ontological and existen-
tial sides of understanding at the cost of issues related to the grounds of 
validity in understanding. Gjesdal’s work not only contains a persuasive 
criticism of Gadamer’s views, but it also steers hermeneutic theory to a 
direction which will hopefully receive more attention within contempo-
rary hermeneutics.
The first parts of Gjesdal’s book examine the historical roots of 
Gadamer’s views and the philosophical framework on art and the aes-
thetic which Gadamer tries to overcome with his hermeneutic concep-
tion. The framework Gadamer seeks to dethrone understands the experi-
ence of art on a model which is dominated by an attitude of “aesthetic 
consciousness.” In her reading, Gjesdal rightly situates Gadamer’s cri-
tique of this position to the very heart of his hermeneutics and simul-
taneously convincingly shows that the hermeneutic conception of the 
experience of art Gadamer offers in place of this model is not an isolated 
part of Gadamer’s theory, but, in fact, in many ways lays a foundation for 
some of its most important aspects, such as the conception of rationality 
it contains.
With the term aesthetic consciousness Gadamer refers to a view of 
aesthetic perception which emphasizes its immediate and subjective 
character. Gadamer traces the origin of this approach to Romanticism 
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and to the attempt characteristic of that period to locate a place for art in 
a world which was increasingly being dominated by a scientific outlook. 
However, in Gadamer’s view, the response offered by the account appeal-
ing to the characteristic features of aesthetic consciousness to the chal-
lenge this change in worldview poses for art is of a wrong sort. This is 
because by insisting on the autonomy of aesthetic perception from other 
modes of perception and experience, aesthetic consciousness dissociates 
art and the aesthetic from other fields of human life and, consequently, 
diminishes their potential impact on these fields. In short, aesthetic con-
sciousness renders art cognitively impotent and removes art from the 
realm of truth.
One of the most important elements of Gadamer’s attempt to over-
come the framework of aesthetic consciousness is his critical engage-
ment with Kant’s aesthetic theory. While Gadamer does see some herme-
neutic potential especially in Kant’s concept of the ideal of beauty, in his 
view, Kant’s aesthetic theory is nevertheless underpinned by highly anti-
hermeneutic elements. Kant’s most severe shortcoming from Gadamer’s 
point of view is the way Kant places natural beauty above artistic beauty. 
The position these two forms of beauty occupy within Kant’s scheme is 
explained by his attempt to lay a foundation for aesthetic judgments. 
In Kant’s view, aesthetic judgments involve a specific kind of subjective 
universality. That is, while they are based on the feeling that the con-
templation of a given object gives rise to in the subject of experience, 
aesthetic judgments nevertheless make a claim to universality. The most 
important condition that Kant sets for the universality of aesthetic judg-
ments is their disinterested nature. Aesthetic judgments are for Kant 
pure in the sense that they do not involve a reference, for example, to the 
possible purposes the object under judgment might serve. Pure aesthetic 
judgments in other words approach an object’s beauty without consider-
ing the object’s place within human practices. 
Due to the absence of human concerns and traces of human intention-
ality only natural beauty is able to meet the conditions that Kant sets for 
pure aesthetic judgments. However, it is precisely the reasons which lead 
Kant to ascribe natural beauty this kind of privileged position within the 
realm of the aesthetic that makes Kant’s aesthetic theory and the view 
of aesthetic experience it involves so unappealing to Gadamer, for, in 
his view, the cost of the purity of aesthetic judgments is their cognitive 
irrelevance. By divorcing natural beauty from the different contexts of 
human culture, it is simultaneously deprived of all those factors whose 
position within art and the aesthetic Gadamer seeks to emphasize, that 
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is, their capacity to develop human self-understanding and to be vehicles 
of truth. Natural beauty does not give rise to the kind of dialogical en-
counter which Gadamer sees as fundamental for the experience of art 
and which serves as a basis for Gadamer’s explanation regarding its cog-
nitive relevance. Only by replacing Kant’s subjective and non-cognitive 
account of the aesthetic with a more hermeneutic conception can the 
true significance of art reveal itself.
By inserting Kant’s account of natural beauty into the wider context 
of Kant’s critical philosophy, something Gadamer fails to do, Gjesdal is 
able to reveal some shortcomings in Gadamer’s reading of Kant’s notion 
of natural beauty. In Gjesdal’s view, a more detailed reading shows that 
Kant did not take natural beauty to be devoid of cognitive relevance (44). 
Pointing out the defects in Gadamer’s reading of Kant is only one of the 
interesting problems that Gjesdal reveals in Gadamer’s hermeneutics in 
the course of her investigation. Others include Gadamer’s failure to see 
romantic aesthetics in the context of modernity (78) and Gadamer’s mis-
reading of Celan’s poetry (100–101). Gjesdal also argues that Gadamer’s 
notorious rehabilitation of the role of prejudice against Enlightenment’s 
alleged “prejudice against prejudice itself”  is based on a false understand-
ing of the notion of prejudice in Enlightenment philosophy (126).
However, as Gjesdal points out, these possible misunderstandings 
do not by themselves deprive of validity the theoretical conclusions in 
which, for example, Gadamer’s allegedly problematic reading of Kant 
plays a role. On the contrary, Gjesdal argues that Gadamer’s criticism 
of aesthetic consciousness and the historically and linguistic mediated 
view of the aesthetic, with which he seeks to replace that outlook, are 
among the most fruitful parts of Gadamer’s hermeneutics.
Given Gadamer’s aim to prove the cognitive relevance of art and his 
skepticism regarding aesthetic consciousness’ ability to embrace this 
factor, what Gadamer’s hermeneutic conception of art and the aesthetic 
needs is a notion of truth, knowledge, and rationality comprehensive 
enough to explain the cognitive relevance of art. Such a conception 
Gadamer finds in Heidegger’s account of the relationship between art 
and truth. As is well known, Heidegger tried to rehabilitate the Greek 
under standing of truth as aletheia, that is, as disclosure of being, which 
he saw as an ontological condition for the traditional conception of truth 
as correspondence. For Heidegger, art is one way in which being dis-
closes itself. This idea of Heidegger’s is perhaps the most important el-
ement in Gadamer’s attempt to overcome aesthetic consciousness. An 
artwork discloses a world in the sense that it reveals a pre-predicative 
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“horizon of meaning” that draws the subject of experience to the work. 
As a consequence, experience of art is detached from purely subjective 
elements, for it is imbued with political, ethical, religious, and other 
kinds of cultural values and factors that orient our being in the world. 
This is the essence of Gadamer’s hermeneutic conception of experience. 
For Gadamer, this experience is also essentially historical. The world of 
the work discloses itself differently to different people and influences 
people’s self-understanding differently.
However, in Gjesdal’s view, the ontological conception of understand-
ing, which results from the emphasis on the world-disclosing nature of 
art in Gadamer’s criticism of aesthetic consciousness, has one substan-
tial drawback. Framing experience of art in terms of passivity and self-
surrender to the play which the world of the work gives rise to leaves 
Gadamer ill-equipped to deal with epistemological questions related to 
understanding. This conclusion is especially damaging to Gadamer’s ac-
count, for, in Gjesdal’s opinion, Gadamer did not intend the emphasis on 
the ontological conception of understanding to rule out the possibility of 
critical reflection concerning understanding.
At this point Gjesdal argues that some of the misunderstandings Ga-
damer’s hermeneutics is plagued by are in danger of weakening Ga-
damer’s theoretical position as a whole. While Gadamer is highly in-
fluenced by Hegel’s conception of the historical nature of reason, he is 
nevertheless critical of Hegel’s account of reason’s development to full 
self-understanding. For both, reason develops in a dialogical manner 
between the subject and the historical past of her tradition and culture, 
but unlike Hegel, Gadamer argues that this dialogue can never achieve 
a point of termination. However, in Gjesdal’s view, in his criticism Ga-
damer approaches Hegel’s conception of the historicity of reason in 
false terms, for he fails to appreciate the problem to which Hegel’s ac-
count is a response; that is, “in his craving for an existentially apt ap-
proach to historical understanding, Gadamer simply evades the under-
lying problem of Hegel’s philosophy of history, namely the possibility 
of combining a notion of the historicity of reason with the question of 
validity in understanding.” (153). This misgiving in Gadamer’s reading 
together with his failure to tackle the question Gjesdal sees Hegel to 
have been preoccupied with severely diminish the significance of Ga-
damer’s hermeneutics for contemporary philosophy, for the problem 
of how to combine the ontological and epistemological sides of under-
standing has, in Gjesdal’s opinion, been highly important for many im-
portant figures of contemporary philosophy.
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Gjesdal’s assessment of the importance of normative questions related 
to understanding for hermeneutics leads to the most interesting part of 
her book, the rehabilitation of Friedrich Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics. 
Given the harsh reception which Schleiermacher has received within con-
temporary hermeneutics drawing on Gadamer’s views, Gjesdal’s aim can 
be considered highly daring. Gadamer partly develops his own existen-
tial-ontological form of hermeneutics in an explicit confrontation with 
Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics. An important factor which, in Gjesdal’s 
opinion, explains the tone of Schleiermacher’s reception is that the sec-
ondary literature on Gadamer has tended to take Gadamer’s highly nega-
tive assessment of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics for granted without 
investigating the accuracy of the understanding of Schleiermacher’s phil-
osophy on which that assessment is based. Gjesdal singles out numerous 
problems in Gadamer’s reading of Schleiermacher, Gjesdal in fact claim-
ing that “Gadamer never enters into a fair discussion of Schleiermacher’s 
philosophy of interpretation, but leaves the reader with a systematically 
distorted picture” of some of its most important parts (155).
Gadamer’s most serious mistake is that in his criticism he takes only 
one of the two sides which in Schleiermacher’s view make up the process 
of interpretation into account. Schleiermacher sees interpretation to con-
sist of two mutually reinforcing sides, grammatical interpretation and 
psychological interpretation. Gadamer, however, addresses only the lat-
ter, and as a result ends up with a highly psychological picture of Schleier-
macher’s philosophy of interpretation which, in turn, distorts the view of 
the method of divination – the key notion of Schleiermacher’s theory – 
Gadamer’s criticism involves. According to Gadamer, for Schleiermacher 
interpretation has to do with re-experiencing the immediate experiences 
which the author went through during the process of creation. These are 
the experiences the interpreter hunts by following the method of divina-
tion and the certainty of his interpretation is based on how well he man-
ages to track the author’s original processes. Since the kind of aesthetic 
immediacy supposed in the method of divination cannot be achieved, as 
Gadamer’s criticism of aesthetic consciousness, for example, shows, one 
of the essential parts of Schleiermacher’s philosophy of interpretation 
rests on shaky ground. 
However, according to Gjesdal, once it has been observed that the 
psychological side of interpretation cannot be dissociated from the 
grammatical side in Schleiermacher’s account, Gadamer’s criticism of 
Schleiermacher is severely undermined, for it shows that for Schleier-
macher individuality is not characterized by the kinds of features 
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Gadamer assumes. Like Gadamer himself, Schleiermacher emphasizes 
the way individuality and thought are intersubjective by nature and made 
possible by language. In other words, “contrary to the view that Gadamer 
ascribes to Schleiermacher, individuality does not refer to something in-
ner, pre-linguistic, pre-cultural, or pre-cognitive, but is concerned with 
the way in which ideas are historically mediated and modified through 
the universal media of language and culture.” (167–168). A more careful 
reading of Schleiermacher’s account of individuality also shows that the 
method of divination should not be understood in terms of aesthetic 
immediacy, but it should be seen as more akin to “a creative hypothesis-
making about the meaning of a text or passage.” (158).
Gadamer is also wrong in claiming that Schleiermacher would not 
take the problem of the historicity of understanding seriously. On the 
contrary, as Gjesdal shows, for Schleiermacher it is precisely because our 
understanding is highly influenced by our historical context that a criti-
cal scrutiny of our interpretative methods is called for, so that we can 
acquire a more detailed picture of which of them are merely the products 
of our personal idiosyncrasies and which have a claim to a more general 
validity. To be sure, interpretative hypotheses can never attain a level 
of absolute certainty, but this should not be seen as undercutting the 
attempt to critically evaluate the methods by which the validity of inter-
pretations is assessed. For Gjesdal, the ultimate value of Schleiermacher’s 
hermeneutics precisely lies in the fact that it manages to account for the 
historical nature of self-understanding, while simultaneously providing 
tools for assessing the validity of different interpretations.
Gjesdal’s book is in many ways a topical one. The main theoretical 
issue which Gjesdal raises, namely, the need to return to questions of 
validity in interpretation which preoccupied Schleiermacher and other 
past hermeneutists, as well as the way she defends the importance of 
this reorientation in hermeneutic theory, makes Gjesdal’s work an im-
portant addition to a line of criticism which has been aimed against Ga-
damer since the 1960s and which is gradually gathering strength anew. 
The most known critique of this form, at least in the context of literary 
theory, is the one formulated by E.D. Hirsch which sees Gadamer’s failure 
to deal with the problem of validity in interpretation successfully as its 
main drawback. In the secondary literature on Gadamer, the usual rejoin-
der to this criticism has been that it approaches Gadamer’s hermeneutics 
in false terms, that is, Hirsch’s criticism overlooks that the primary inter-
est of Gadamer’s hermeneutics does not concern normative questions 
related to understanding. As a consequence, Hirsch fails to see the way 
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in which Gadamer tries to move the focus point of hermeneutics from 
methodological questions to ontological-existential issues which Heide-
gger brought to light.
What Gjesdal’s discussion of Gadamer’s views implies is that Gadamer’s 
commentators may indeed be correct in claiming that the true concerns 
of Gadamer’s hermeneutics lie elsewhere than in the question regarding 
the grounds of validity in interpretation and understanding, but that it is, 
nevertheless, a substantial shortcoming of Gadamer’s hermeneutics that it 
fails to address this problem properly.
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